University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 19
Issue 2 Volume 19 Issue 2 (Spring 2012)

Article 4

4-1-2012

Not In It For The Long Run: China's Solution For Compliance With
TRIPS Requires More Than A Nine-month Campaign
Devon Spencer

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Devon Spencer, Not In It For The Long Run: China's Solution For Compliance With TRIPS Requires More
Than A Nine-month Campaign, 19 U. Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 197 (2012)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr/vol19/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami International and Comparative
Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.

NOT IN IT FOR THE LONG RUN: CHINA'S SOLUTION FOR
COMPLIANCE WITH TRIPS REQUIRES MORE THAN A
NINE-MONTH CAMPAIGN
Devon Spencer
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION
..................................
............. 198
PIRACY AND THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY IN CHINA................204
A. AN INDUSTRY BACKDROP
.....................
.......... 204
B. LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS OF PAST ACTION TAKEN BY THE MUSIC
INDUSTRY AGAINST DIGITAL PIRACY IN CHINA............206
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
C. IS THERE REALLY A PROBLEM?
209
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE WTO AND THE
U.S.'s 2007 TRIPS COMPLAINT.........................211
IV. CHINA's RESOLUTION TO TRIPS COMPLIANCE ......
.......... 218
A. CREATION OF A SEPARATE GROUP FOR ENFORCEMENT............221
B. CAMPAIGN TIMELINE
............................
...... 221
V. AN OVERVIEW OF CHINA'S JUDICIAL AND
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
............................
......... 222
A. CHINA'S UNDEVELOPED LEGAL SYSTEM
LEAVES MUCH TO BE DESIRED
............................ 223
B. CHINA'S ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS AND DECENTRALIZED
GOVERNMENT PRESENT A ROADBLOCK TO THE LEVEL OF IPRS
LONGED FOR BY DEVELOPED NATIONS
.................... 226
VI. A BREAKTHROUGH AT LAST?
AN EXAMINATION OF CHINA'S CAMPAIGN.
...................
231
VII. LONG-TERM IPR CAMPAIGN AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
WILL HELP FOSTER THE IP CULTURE DESIRED BY DEVELOPED
NATIONS IN CHINA.
.......................................
235
A. A LONG-TERM CENTRALIZED PLAN OF ATTACK ...................... 236
B. OTHER DEVELOPED NATIONS SHOULD ASSIST CHINA
WITH IMPLEMENTION OF THE CAMPAIGN ......................... 238
C. COOPERATION WITH IPR HOLDERS WILL
HELP PROMOTE ENFORCEMENT
.......................... 239
D. OTHER POSITIVE EFFECTS FROM STRONGER PROTECTION OF
............. 240
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA...

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.

198
I.

V. 19

INTRODUCTION

From the beginning of the Communist era in 1949, China has
seen its economy develop into what it is today, a global power. In
2009, China was the United States' (hereinafter U.S.) second-largest
trading partner, accounting for 14.5 percent of the U.S.'s total trade
market.1 In 2010, China boasted the world's third largest economy, 2
laying claim to a market that attracts roughly 23 billion in foreign
investments.3 China is also the world's largest holder of foreign
exchange reserves. 4 China's continued economic growth is in part
due to its accession into the World Trade Organization (hereinafter
WTO) on December 11, 2001.5 Along with WTO membership, China
also became part of the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (hereinafter TRIP or TRIPS), 6 requiring it to
adopt minimum standards of Intellectual Property Rights
(hereinafter IPR or IPRs) with the goal of reducing international trade
barriers.7 While China amended its copyright laws to meet minimum
requirements set by the WTO and TRIPS, 8 many commentators
believe that China's enforcement of those standards is still lacking the
force necessary to bring it into compliance with the protection offered
in other leading nations. 9

1 China: Intellectual Property Infringement, Indigenous Innovation Policies, and
Frameworks for Measuring the Effects on the U.S. Economy, Inv. No. 332-514,

USITC Pub. 4199, 2-3 (Nov. 2010) (Amended),

available at http:/www.

usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4199.pdf [hereinafter "USITC"].
2 Pasha L. Hsieh, China's Development of InternationalEconomic Law and WTO
Legal Capacity Building, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 997, 997 (2010).
3Id
4

at 998.

Id. at 997.

Warren Newberry, Copyright Reform in China: A "TRIPS" Much Shorter and Less
Strange Than Imagined?, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1425 (2003).
6 id
7

Id.

8 Id.

9 Id. (stating that "In some ways, China has achieved staggering success in reforming
its copyright regime to meet international standards. In other ways, namely,

enforcement of those standards, China still has a long way to go."); see also Jung
Yun (Jennifer) Yang, Bringing the Question of Chinese 1PR Enforcement to the
WTO Under Trips: An Effective Strategy of a Meaningless and Overused Tactic by
the U.S.?, 10 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y, Spring 2010, at 3 (arguing that "China
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Numerous outdoor markets and malls dedicated solely to the
distribution and sale of both pirated and counterfeit items10 including, but not limited to, movies, music, designer bags, shoes,
wallets, pharmaceuticals and even motorcycles" - contributes to the
belief that piracy levels in China will not materially decrease in the
near future. 12 In 2009, the International Intellectual Property Alliance
estimated $3.5 billion in U.S. trade losses in China as a result of
copyright infringement. 3 In addition, the U.S. International Trade
Commission estimated that American businesses lost $48 billion and
2.1 million jobs in 2009 due to Intellectual Property (hereinafter IP)
violations in China. 14 In that same year, 79% of counterfeit and
pirated items seized at the U.S. border were from China.15 China's
rampant piracy also affects the European Union, as 53 million pirated
CDs, DVDs and cassettes from China made their way into the E.U. in
2008.16 In fact, many individuals in China have largely relied on
income generated from the sale of infringing goods in their local city
to support themselves, their families and the overall community. 7
should be allowed time to develop into a country which is better equipped to enforce
IPRs and fully comply with its TRIPS obligations.").

10Paulina

Rezier, Breaking Through the Great Wall: Problems of Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights in China, 14 TOURO INT'L. L. REV. 194, 194 (2010);
What is the Difference between Piracy and Counterfeiting?, STOPFAKES.GOV,
http://www.stopfakes.gov/faqs/what-difference-between-piracy-and-counterfeiting
(last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (using "counterfeit" to describe fake goods, whereas
"piracy" is used to describe the reproduction of copyrighted items without the
owner's permission, such as movies, music, and books).
I Rezler, supra note 10, at 194.
12 But see China Vows Tougher Punishmentsfor Copyright Piracy, REUTERS, Jan.
10, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/0111 /china-piracyidUSTOE7OAO3F2O1 10111 [hereinafter Tougher Punishments] (China has created
campaigns aimed at punishing IP violators of counterfeit books, music, DVDs and
software).
13 Id.
14 China Claims Victory in 9-Month Anti-Piracy Campaign, ROCKEFELLER NEWS OF
THE WORLD MAGAZINE
(July 12, 2011), http://www.rockefellernews.com/
21778/china-claims-victory-in-9-month-anti-piracy-campaign/.
15 USITC, supra note 1 at 2-10.
16 See id. ("The global scale of physical infringement is suggested by the 79 million
individual CDs, DVDs, and cassettes detained for suspected copyright violation by
EU customs authorities in 2008, 68 percent of which originated in China.").
7 Rezler, supra note 10,
at 253.
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For years, the U.S. has been the primary force pushing for
stronger IPR protection and enforcement to place a stranglehold on
the rampant piracy and counterfeiting that occurs in China.1 8 The
United States Trade Representative (hereinafter USTR) placed China
on its Priority Foreign List multiple times for repeatedly failing to
provide adequate IPR protection or enforcement. 19 In 1991, 1995 and
again in 1996, China was listed as one of the "Priority Foreign
Countries" in the USTR's annual Special 301 report. 20 In each
instance, the U.S also threated China with unilateral trade sanctions. 21
However, as we will see, these attempts did nothing to curtail
China's IP issues, and as a result, the U.S. turned to the Dispute
Settlement Body (hereinafter DSB) of the WTO in hopes that a
resolution to infringement issues plaguing China could be reached.
Therefore, in April 2007, the U.S. filed a complaint with the WTO
against China, alleging that China was not in compliance with
TRIPS.22 On January 26, 2009, the DSB released its decision on the
complaint, 23 finding China not to be in compliance with various
aspects of the TRIPS Agreement, 24 giving China a deadline of March
Yang, supra note 9, at 17-18 ("In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 'the U.S.
government repeatedly threatened China with a series of economic sanctions, trade
wars, non-renewal of Most-Favored Nation [] status, and opposition to [China's]
entry into the [WTO].").
19 Yang, supra note
9, at 18.
20 Jiarui Liu, Article, The Tough Reality of Copyright Piracy:
A Case Study of the
Music Industry in China, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 621, 624-625 (2010)
(stating that China has been placed on the Priority Foreign Countries list three times:
1991, 1995 & 1996); see Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat.
1978 (1975) (codified as amended in 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2006) (Under Special 301
provisions of the 1974 Trade Act, the United States Trade Representative ("USTR")
must identify those countries that have "onerous or egregious" acts or policies that
deny adequate intellectual property rights or deny fair and equitable protections to
persons relying upon such protection. These countries will be deemed "Priority
Foreign Countries" and will be subject to further investigation and possible
sanctions. In addition, Special 301 provisions have led to the creation of a "Priority
Watch List" and "Watch List." Countries on either of these lists will receive
increased bilateral attention in regards to their intellectual property protection.)
21 Liu, supra note 20, at 625.
22 Id; Kim, infra note
92, at 104.
23 Kevin C. Lacey, China and the WTO: Targeting
China's 1PR Record, 2 No. 3
LANDSLIDE 33, 33 (2010).
24 Yang, supra note 9, at 2.
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2010 to bring its IPR and enforcement of such rights into compliance
with TRIPS.25
Just one day before the DSB's deadline, 26 China announced
that the Standing Committee of the 11th National People's Congress
had approved various amendments to the Chinese Copyright Law as
recommended by the DBS in 2009.27 In addition, the Standing
Committee of the 11th National People's Congress implemented its
own amendments to China's Copyright Law. 28 By doing so, China's
IP laws were now in compliance with TRIPS. More importantly,
Chon Quan, China's vice minister of commerce, announced the
Chinese State Council institution of a six-month campaign entitled,
"Special Campaign to Combat IPR Infringement and the
Manufacture and Sales of Counterfeit and Shoddy Commodities"
(hereinafter Campaign) to fight IPR infringement. 29

Id.; see also Daniel Pruzin, China Cites Full Compliance with WTO Rulings on
Intellectual Property Rights, 79 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 644 (2010)
(noting that the actual deadline is March 20, 2010).
26 Pruzin, supra
note 25.
27 The panel requested China make amendments to its Copyright
Law to bring it into
compliance with Articles 9.1 and 59 of TRIPS. Specifically, the panel concluded that
China's Copyright Law . . . was inconsistent with its "obligations under: (i) Article
5(1) of the Berne Convention (1971), as incorporated by Article 9.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement; and (ii) Article 41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement . . . [and that] the Customs
measures are inconsistent with Article 59 of the TRIPS Agreement." Report of the
Panel, China - Measures Affecting The Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter WTO Report].
28 Pruzin,supra note 25 (Chinese officials stated that this amendment would improve
the disposal procedures for seized products, one of the United States' main concerns
in its original complaint filed with the WTO in 2007).
29 Williams & Mihalkanin, infra note 139, at 43; Amy Tsui, Chinese Official Touts
China's Campaign to go to Source of Counterfeit Good, 81 PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. 119 (2010); see also Overview of the Special Campaign against IPR
Infringement and Counterfeits, EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN
THE
KINGDOM
OF
DENMARK
(Dec.
10,
2010),
http://dk.chinaembassy.org/eng/News/t777199.htm
(the decision to launch the campaign was
actually made on October 19, 2010 during an executive meeting on the State
Council, but was not announced until November 2010 during a U.S. Chamber of
Commerce Meeting); see also Lara Farrar, Can China Became An Intellectual
Property Powerhouse?, CNN
(Feb.
15,
2011), http://edition.cnn.com/
2011/BUSINESS/02/14/china.intellectual.property/index.html
(China has also
outlined a plan to increase their annual patent filings to two million by 2015).
25
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During a January 2011 news conference,30 Geo Feng, China's
deputy director of the Ministry of Public Security's Economic Crimes
Investigation Bureau announced that since the launch of the
Campaign in November, they have uncovered over 2,000 cases of IPR
violations resulting in more than 4,000 arrests.31 The Chinese
Ministry of Public Security's Economic Crimes Investigation Bureau
estimates that new cases uncovered so far during the Campaign have
an estimated value of over $348 million, 32 approximately three times
the value of all IPR infringement in China during 2010.33
Even with an increase in the number of IPR cases, many
commentators still believe China's troubles begin and end with its
punishments, and enforcements of such punishments, for IPR
violators. 34 For example, the music industry is concerned with a level
of music piracy in China that is triple the worldwide average.3 5 Since
2000, the advent of peer-to-peer file sharing networks has contributed
to a steady decline in global music sales. 36 More importantly, in a
country where over 83% of consumers prefer foreign music, 3 7 it may
come as no surprise that China's illegal music market is dominated
by foreign music. 38 The increased demand for foreign music can be
seen as one of the reasons the music industry has become even more
concerned with China's IPR protection.
While China has had issues with enforcing and protecting all
forms of IPRs, including both trademarks and copyrights, this paper
will better address the issues revolving around copyright protection,
as the majority of complaints from intellectual property right holders
deal with copyright issues involving music, literature and movies.
30

3

Tougher Punishments, supra note 12.

d2

32 Id.

(approximately 2.3 billion Yuan).

33 Id

34

Id (while China has promised to achieve "concrete results" from the six month

campaign, U.S. groups maintain that without a sustained effort, there will be no
change in the level of IP violations.); see generally Lacey, supra note 23.
35 Liu, supra note 20, at 625-27 (the level of music piracy in China was between
85
% to 9 0% from 2000 to 2007, while the average for the world was approximately
34%).

36

3

38

Id. at 631.
Id at 630.

i.
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However, that is not to say that other aspects of IPR protection have
not been, and continue to be, under scrutiny in China. As we will see,
there are countless issues with fake merchandising and the improper
use of trademarks on such merchandising. 39 Furthermore, more likely
than not, when there is infringement of one's copyright, there may
likely be an infringement on one's trademark right. For example, as
with illegal music made and sold on the streets, they are often
packaged with printed images containing the band's name. As most
bands, if not all, register their names with the U.S. Trademark Office,
there is likely to be trademark infringement in the use of the name, in
addition to copyright infringement by making an unauthorized
duplication of the CD. In addition, China's Campaign was mostly
structured to address copyright infringement, including the
manufacturing of counterfeit goods. 40 However, as the U.S.'s claims
involved disposal methods used by China, including the removal of
infringing labeling, it is clear that trademark issues are also prevalent
in China.41 The solutions proposed in this paper will be applicable to
not only copyright, but to all other forms of IPRs, as the lack of
adequate protection and enforcement is an issue predominant among
all IPRs in China. Issues involving the protection of IPRs extend
further than that of only copyright issues, but even in solely that
respect, the harm is great.
Together, we will explore the effects of piracy in China, its
legal structure, the U.S.'s 2007 TRIPS complaint against China and its
response to the complaint, as well as the Campaign's shortcomings.
In addition, this article also suggest ways China can bring protection
and enforcement of China's IPRs up to par with that of other
countries in the WTO. Part II tackles the effect on the music industry
resulting from IPR infringement in China and its new initiatives to
protect and enforce IPRs. Part III briefly describes the U.S.'s TRIPS
complaint against China and the history behind it. Part IV evaluates
China's resolution to bring itself into compliance with TRIPS by
examining the Campaign initiated by China's State Council. Part V
examines China's legal system to evaluate whether or not it is
adequate enough to promote the IPR protection requested of China.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part IV.
41 See infra Part III.
39

40
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Finally, part VI focuses on ways China, with the assistance of
developed nations, can bring its IPR standards and enforcement up
to par with the WTO and TRIPS. While assistance from developed
nations may seem as a foreign concept to China considering its
beliefs in sovereignty, recent comments from China's President Hu
Jinato at the CEO summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation,
indicates a shift from these beliefs; President Jinato asked for both
developed and developing countries to work together in order to
achieve "balanced, inclusive, sustainable, innovative and secure
growth of the world economy." 42
II. PIRACY AND THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY IN CHINA
A. An Industry Backdrop
More than 2.2 million middle-class Americans depend on the
entertainment industry alone for jobs; many millions more rely on
other IP driven industries for jobs.43 However, globally, the music
industry has seen a 310% decrease in monetary value from 2004 to
2010.44 As a country with rampant IPR violations and few
enforcement mechanisms in place to deter future violators, China
leads the way in digital music piracy. The International Intellectual
Property Alliance (hereinafter IIPA) estimates that 99% of all music
downloaded in China is pirated.45 The IIPA also estimates that from
2000 to 2007, an average of nearly 87.5% of China's music industry
was dominated by pirated music, 46 with a high of 93% in 2000 and a
low of 85% from 2004 to 2006.47 When compared with music piracy
rates worldwide, these numbers are even more astonishing.
According to the International Federation of the Phonographic
See infra Part VII.E.
Press Release, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., MPAA Statement
on
Strong Showing of Support for Stop Online Piracy Act (Dec. 16, 2011), available at
http://mpaa.org/resources/5a0a212e-c86b-4e9a-abfl-2734al5862cd.pdf.
44 IFPI Digital Music Report 2011: Music at the Touch of a Button, INT'L FEDN OF
THE
PHONOGRAPHIC
INDUS.
(2011),
available at http://www.ifpi.org/
content/library/DMR201 .pdf.
45 USITC, supra note 1, at D-12.
46 Liu, supra note 20, at 625.
47
1d. at 626-27.
42
43
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Industry (hereinafter IFPI), the worldwide music piracy rate is
roughly 35%,48 making China's level of music piracy almost three
times the world average. Since 2001, the number of Internet users in
China has grown at an annual rate of 39%,49 culminating in 384
million users in December 2009.5o Considering that China's
population was 1.3 billion by mid-2011,5 1 the number of Internet
users is sure to increase as the population grows and Internet usage
becomes more common, paving the way for an even larger numbers
of IPR violations.
China's rampant levels of music piracy can be directly
attributed to the weak IPR protection of the Internet. Where
individuals in most other countries must use peer-to-peer file sharing
networks or bit-torrent networks to share illegal music files, Chinese
infringers can simply use their web browsers to find any music they
wish to download. 52 For example, Baidu, one of China's largest
search engines, offers users the ability to download music using its
search engines.53 All a user has to do is type in the name of the song,
and Baidu will return a query of results listing links for direct
downloads.5 4 This is unlike traditional peer-to-peer networks or bittorrent methods in which users have to download additional
software to access the song.5 5 Through this business model, Baidu
MP3 is able to offer a more extensive catalog of songs than that of any
legitimate music provider. 56 Originally founded in 1999,57 Baidu now
48 Id.

49
50

at 627.
USITC, supra note 1, at 3-4.

1d.

Background Note: China, U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.
state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm.
52 See Liu, supra note 20, at 628 - 629 (noting that
because of such heavy
restrictions outside of China, these Chinese-based search engines typically block
access from IP addresses outside of China to limit their possible exposure to foreign
jurisdictions. Therefore, all of these music files originate from within the country.).
53

Id

54

Id. at 628.
Carmen

Carmack, How BitTorrent Works, How STUFF WORKS,
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/bittorrent.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2012).
56 Liu, supra note 20, at 628.
57 Copyright Infringement in China: The War Against Baidu, FIELD FISHER
WATERHOUSE
(Sept. 9, 2008), http://www.ffw.com/publications/all/articles/
copyright-infringement-china.aspx [hereinafter The War Against Baidu].
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holds over 75% of China's search engine market,5 8 and was ranked
the world's 13th most popular website in 2008 by Alexa Internet, Inc.,
a company that specializes in monitoring website traffic. 59 In 2009,
Pali Research, the equity research division of Pali Capital Inc.,
estimated that roughly 80% of all searches on Baidu were for music
files. 60
B. Limited Effectiveness of Past Action Taken by the Music
Industry Against DigitalPiracy in China
Efforts by members of the music industry to shut down Baidu
have failed. In 2005 the four major U.S. record labels - Warner, Sony
BMG, EMI, and Universal - along with three Chinese companies Gold Label, Cinepoly, and Go East - brought a copyright
infringement claim against Baidu in the Beijing First Intermediate
Court. 61 The plaintiffs argued that by providing links to websites
from which illegal music could be downloaded, Baidu was
committing copyright infringement. 62 Ultimately, the Court sided
with Baidu, holding that by only providing links, and not the actual
infringing content, the search engine should not be held liable. 63 On
appeal, the court stated that Baidu could only be liable for copyright
infringement under one of two circumstances: (1) if Baidu failed to
remove the infringing links after notification; or (2) if the company
had actual knowledge that the links contained pirated music. 64
Because Baidu never received any removal notices of infringing links
and actual knowledge was not proved, the appeals court affirmed the
Lance Whitney, China Launches New State-Run Search Engine, CNET NEWS
(Feb. 22, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023 3-20034748-93.htm; see also
Charts: China 2011 Q2 Search Engine Market Update, CHINA INTERNET WATCH
(July 19, 2011), http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/ 1187/search-engine-market-q22011/.
59 The War Against Baidu, supra note 57.
6o Leena Rao, Watch Out Baidu, China Clamps Down On Music Piracy (Sept. 4.
2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/09/04/watch-out-baidu-china-clamps-down-onmusic-piracy/; USITC, supra note 1, at 3-5.
61 The War Against Baidu, supra
note 57.
62 id.
58

63

Id

64 id.
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Intermediate Court's decision, finding Baidu not guilty of copyright
infringement.6 5
While the case against Baidu was still being
decided, IFPI, EMI, Mercury Records, Sony BMG, and Warner Music
brought a similar suit against Yahoo! China in the Beijing People's
High Court. 66 There, the Court found Yahoo! China to be guilty of
contributory infringement. 67 On appeal, the decision was affirmed
and Yahoo! China was ordered to remove any and all links to
infringing music. 68 The judgment against Yahoo! China was a major
victory for the music industry.
In 2010, a lawsuit was filed by the IFPI against Baidu and
Sohu, another search engine that provides links to infringing
content. 69 There, the Beijing Court found Sohu liable for
infringement, but Baidu was once again found not liable. 70 While this
case did not result in the complete removal of all infringing content
on Baidu, it does display the impact judicial enforcement can have in
fighting IPR infringement in China, as Baidu abided by the ruling in
its earlier case without question. However, as tremendous amounts
of pirated material still remained on Baidu's servers, record
companies decided to pursue other methods to minimize Baidu's
influence in music piracy.
With the understanding that Baidu generates most of its
revenue through advertising, record companies decided to attack the
site's advertising channels. 7' In 2008, the Music Copyright Society of
65 Id.
66

id
Id.
68 Yimei Guo, "Safe Harbor" Doctrine: A Panaceafor
Chinese Search Engine's
Copyright Infringement Liability or Not, 2010 INT'L CONF. ON E-Bus. & E-Gov'T
1982, 1983 (2010) (Three main reasons can be used to explain the different
outcomes: (i) the 2006 Ordinance on the Protection of the Right to Network
Dissemination of Information was not applicable in the Baidu case; (2) Yahoo!
China was faced with charges of both contributory and direct liability whereas Baidu
only faced direct liability; and (3) Baidu was never provided notice regarding the
illegality of the links of their website, whereas Yahoo! China had notice but only
removed the links provided and nothing more).
69 USITC, supra note 1, at 3-5.
70 Id This time, Baidu had followed the ruling from their 2005
case and removed all
infringing links from its website once they received notice. Id; see also The War
Against Baidu, supra note 57.
7 The War Against Baidu, supra
note 57.
67
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China, IFPI, Universal Music, EMI, Sony BMG Entertainment,
Warner-Chappell Music, Seed Music, R2G, and Zhu Shu Fang Music
sent letters to all major advertisers in China, urging them to not
advertise with Baidu, as doing so will support music piracy. 72
Most recently, China has taken other actions to decrease
Baidu's contributions to piracy by creating its own search engine to
divert traffic from Baidu. In February 2011, China launched a new
government-run search engine, Panguso, which will allow people to
search for news, websites, videos, images, and audio.73 The search
engine will be operated by China Mobile, a telecom company, and
Xinhau, a state-run news agency.74 Panguso's goal is to minimize
Baidu's dominance of the Chinese search engine market,75 which in
turn should decrease Internet piracy, as Baidu is one of the main
contributors. As this search engine is government run, it is expected
that undesirable results, such as illegal music, will be blocked. 76 On
that same note, one may question its effectiveness, as Internet
regulation is nothing new to China.77 In addition, this added
regulation may only further increase China's already great control
over Internet content, whereby it attempts to limit any and all content
the State deems to be negative or unfavorable to itself or its interest.78
For example, as the CNET article mentions, when Reuters attempted
to search politically sensitive China topics on the search engine, only
results expressing the government's viewpoints were returned. 79

72

Id

73

Whitney, supra note 58.

74 d
75
76
77

See id.
Id

See generally Lyombe Eko, Anup Kumar & Qingjiang Yao, Google This: The

Great Firewall of China, the IT Wheel of India, Google Inc., and Internet
Regulation, 15 J. INTERNET L. 3 (2011).
78 Id. at 5 (Various Chinese laws and regulations prohibit information from being
placed on the Internet if the government believes it may damage or endanger: state
security, national unity and power; state honor and interests; or instigates ethnic or
religious hatred. They also prohibit content that promotes superstitious ideas,
pornography, gambling, or violence).
79 Whitney, supra note 58.
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C. Is There Really a Problem?
While the WTO and other organizations have continued to
press China to increase its protection over IPRs, few are challenging
whether or not increased protection is even beneficial to society. Art
Brodsky, an employee of digital rights group Public Knowledge,
questions the numbers provided by the movie industry regarding
infringement, arguing that "[t]he movie business is fond of throwing
out numbers about how many millions of dollars are at risk and how
many thousands of jobs are lost . . . [yet Public Knowledge doesn't
think] it correlates to the state of the industry."8 0 In addition, Tim
O'Reilly, an investor and chief executive of tech-book publisher
O'Reilly Media, argues "the losses due to piracy are far outweighed
by the benefits of the free flow of information, which makes the
world richer, and develops new markets for legitimate content."8 1
Relying on his own books sales as an example, Tim O'Reilly further
states that "most of the people who are downloading unauthorized
copies of [my] books would never have paid us for them anyway." 82
While O'Reilly injects a good dose of realism to the argument for
stronger IPR protection, there are a few exceptions that can be taken.
While it may be true that the free flow of information helps to
develop richer content worldwide and the evolution of market
content, this cannot be said to apply for all industries and companies.
While many people who have illegally downloaded his book would
not have paid for it, this may not be true for popular authors or
artists. For example, artist such as U2, Lady Gaga, Prince, or other
well established, highly sought after acts, are likely to have fans that
may have been just as probable to purchase their music if they were
not able to download it for free. Furthermore, in relation to
companies such as Apple, whose products are being sold by

80

Jenna Wortham & Amy Chozick, The PiracyProblem: Hiow Broad?, N.Y.

TIMES,

Feb. 9, 2012, at Bl.

Id. Tim O'Reilly is considered as the best computer book publisher in the world.
School of Information Science - Hall of Fame, UNIV. OF PITT. SCH. OF INFO. SCl.,
http://www.sis.pitt.edu/~mbsclass/hall of fame/oreilly.html (last visited Apr. 12,
8;

2012).
82

Wortham & Chozick, supra note 80.
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unauthorized dealers or are being copied for sale,83 it may be hard to
argue that individuals would not have paid full price for their
product simply because they were able to get a counterfeit version.
One of the main underlying fallacies of O'Reilly's argument is
that he fails to take into account the impact that readily available
counterfeit goods and pirated content has had on peoples' view of
having to pay for something. As easy as it may be argued that people
would not have paid for his book regardless, this is extremely
difficult to prove, as society has grown more accustomed to "getting
something for nothing."84 One could say that a simple survey asking
a question such as, "would you have paid for this book if it were not
available for free download" may help in proving his statement.
However, there is no measureable means to determine the effect of
the ability to download illegal items has played in one's belief of not
wanting to pay for the book if it was not available illegally.
In addition, it can be argued that entertainment companies
such as Viacom and ABC have gone ahead and made much of their
content available for free on their websites in an attempt to curb
infringement. Popular Comedy Central shows such as "South Park,"
"The Daily Show," and "The Colbert Report" can all be streamed
online for free.8 5 ABC now offers the ability to stream its most
popular and successful television shows, such as "The Bachelor,"
"Desperate Housewives," and "Modern Family," at no charge on
their website. 86 While one may argue that ABC is "free-TV" and as
such, they suffer no hardship from placing their shows on the
Internet, this simply is not true. For both ABC and Comedy Central,
syndication rights are very important, as the station's ability to sell
the rights to show the series can generate revenue for years to come,
even after the show is no longer on its station.8 7 In addition, there is
8' Infra Part VI.

84 See Wortham & Chozick, supra note 80.
85 Wortham & Chozick, supra note 80, at 3. See
also COMEDY CENTRAL,
http://www.comedycentral.com/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2012) (listing all its content
available for free online streaming).
86 ABC, http://abc.go.com/watch (last visited
Apr. 7, 2012).
8 Syndication refers to the ability to sell the rights of a show to another station.
This
usually happens once a show has gone off the air, and will continue to run on
another station. For example, after Seinfeld went off the air on NBC, reruns
continued to be showed on other stations through syndication, and have reportedly

2012

NOT IN IT FOR THE LONG RUN

211

likely a loss of advertising revenue, as there will be fewer viewers
watching the original broadcast due to the fact that they can stream it
online. This issue is somewhat addressed as the streams and websites
usually provide for advertising during, before and/or after the show,
yet one may sometimes skip or fast-forward through the
advertisements after a specific amount of time has passed.88 In
addition, the reach available to markets may be greater for TV as
opposed to online streaming, so it is not the case that stations have a
greater benefit from advertising on-line as opposed to on TV; Dave
Kaplan has even stated that "[it
appears that leveraging the large
reach of TV in combination with the standalone impact and
amplifying effect of online video makes for a successful marketing
strategy," implying that online-advertising alone, cannot make up for
the lost ground from TV advertising. 89
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE WTO AND THE US'S 2007 TRIPS
COMPLAINT
The WTO was officially created on January 1, 1995,90 and
provides a common forum for negotiations between signatory

grossed $2.7 billion in syndication since 1998. See David K. Li, $einfeld Rakes in
$2.7 Bil, N.Y. POST (June 7, 2010), http://wvw.nypost.com/p/entertainment/tv/
einfeld rakes in bil RFu9jOStArywzQ8J5rSvAJ; see also Wortham & Chozick,
supra note 80 (stating that CBS's "The Big Bang Theory" sold for $2 million as

episode to TBS and Fox").
88

See Looking at Lift: Inside Online Video Advertising, NIELSENWIRE (Apr. 19,

2010),

http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online mobile/looking-at-lift-inside-

online-video-advertising/. Research done by Nielsen, the leader in measurement for
market trends, shows that online television ads have actually out performed
Television ads. However, even Nielsen acknowledges this may be misleading, as
web views are often required to click to initiate the content they are trying to watch,
making them, by no choice of theirs, to be more engaged and attentive to the ads and
programs. Id.
89 See id Dave Kaplan is the Senior Vice President of Product Leadership at Nielsen
IAG. Id.
90 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]; Peter Van den Bossche, THE
LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 76 (2d ed. 2008) (stating

that the "World Trade Organization was established and became operational on I
January 1995").
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countries, a set of international commerce rules for any such
negotiations, and assistance to settle trade disputes that cannot be
solved through ordinary negotiation. 91 TRIPS was also implemented
at the same time, introducing a set of international intellectual
property rules for the WTO.92 TRIPS applies to both the trade of
goods and services, with a purpose of "narrow[ing] the gaps in the
way these [intellectual property] rights are protected around the
world and to bring them under common international rules,"93
requiring member states to adopt minimal standards of IPR
protection. 94 Also created during the same time at the WTO were the
dispute settlement system and the DSB, whose main purpose is to
resolve disputes among member countries. 95

Van Den Bossche, supra note 90, at 87-93; see generally Hwan Kim, The World
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System: China - Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 23 N.Y. Int'l L. Rev.
83, 83-90 (2010) (the creation of the WTO, which includes TRIPS & the DSB,
occurred during the Uruguay rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
negotiations, which lasted from 1986 till 1994).
92 Van Den Bossche, supra note 90, at 742-43; see also Kim, supra note 91, at 102;
see Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 90, at Annex 1C; Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter
TRIPS].
93 Kim, supra note 91, at 102 (citing World Trade Organization, Understanding the
WTO 39 (4th ed. 2008) ("acknowledging that the internationally accepted rules for
protecting intellectual property in the TRIPS Agreement have created uniformity")
id at 103 & n. 115; Van Den Bossche, supra note 90, at 743-44 (stating that the main
objective of TRIPS is found in its Preamble, which is to "reduce distortions and
impediments to international trade.. .taking into account the need to promote
effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves
become barriers to trade").
94 Newberry, supra note 5, at 1432-33; see also Brad L. Bacon, The People's
Republic of China and the World Trade Organization:Anticipating a United States
Congressional Dilemma, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 369, 399 (2000) (emphasizing
that the standard set by the TRIPS Agreement is a floor, not a ceiling, for intellectual
property rights).
The WTO dispute settlement system is provided for in the WTO Agreements,
which was negotiated during the Uruguay Round and became operational at the
same time as TRIPS, Jan. 1, 1995. Van Den Bossche, supra note 90, at 169-70.
91
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On December 11, 2001, China became a member of the WTO
and therefore adopted TRIPS. 96 In order to show its commitment to
the WTO, China implemented many amendments to its copyright
laws before even becoming a member of the WTO.97 However, the
enforcement of these IPRs remained a serious problem for China.
As China and the U.S. are now both parties to the WTO, the
U.S. could no longer threaten China with unilateral trade sanctions
without taking other actions first.98 Instead, they were now required
to initiate a formal complaint with the WTO's DSB for any issues they
had with China,9 9 including claims of inadequate protection and
enforcement of IPRs. In 2005, a report from the USTR found that
"China has not resolved critical deficiencies in IPR protection and
enforcement and, as a result, infringements remain at epidemic
levels."10 0 As a result, China was placed on the USTR's Priority Watch
List for the first time due to its failure to comply with various
provisions of TRIPS and previous commitments made at the 2004
meeting of the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade.101
Understanding The WTO: The Organization Members and Observers, WORLD
TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/org 6 _e.htm (last
visited Apr. 7, 2012) [hereinafter Members and Observers]; TRIPS, supra note 92, at
preamble & art. 1 (Member countries are required to adopt TRIPs as part of the
WTO's goal to have more uniformed standards for the protection of IPRs.).
97 Newberry, supra note 5, at 1425 (TRIPS permits trade sanctions, but a country
must first exhaust all their possible remedies under WTO's dispute resolution
process. As the U.S. had not done so, they could not simply bring sanctions against
China. In addition, the WTO favors settlements over trade sanctions.).
98 Id. at 1434.
99 Id
100 Out-Of-Cycle Review Results, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 15
(2005),
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/Document Library/Reports Publications/2005/2005 S
pecial 301/Section Index.html (follow "View the Full Version of the 2005 Special
301 Report" hyperlink).
'01 Id Originally, the USTR created a "priority foreign countries" list to identify
countries "(i) whose acts, practices, or policies are the most onerous or egregious,
and have the greatest adverse economic impact on the United States; and (ii) that are
not entering into good faith negotiations or making significant progress in bilateral
or multilateral negotiations to provide adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property rights." Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Articles, "Special
301": Its Requirements, Implementation, and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'l L.J.
259, 261 (1989-90). However, the USTR later changed this to create a new list, the
96
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Initially, the U.S. did not file a formal complaint after the release of
the USTR's report. 102 However, after requests from U.S. businesses, 103
a resolution introduced by Senator Byron Dorgan 0 4 and an everincreasing trade deficit with China,105 the U.S. filed a formal
complaint in 2007 against China with the WTO for alleged violations
of TRIPS. 106
The complaint set forth three arguments. 107 First, the U.S.
claimed that by failing to provide protection to works that had been
banned for distribution and/or publication by Chinese law, Article 4
of China's Copyright Act was inconsistent with its obligation to
provide copyright protection to all works enumerated in Article 9.1
of TRIPS.108 Therefore, the U.S. accused China of failing to afford
copyright protection to works that should be granted protection
under TRIPS. 109 The DSB arrived at a judgment in favor of the U.S.,
stating that Article 9.1 incorporates the national treatment obligation
of Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention, requiring all works deemed
protectable subject matter under Article 5 of the Berne Convention be
given copyright protection, including many works that had once

"priority watch list," for countries that were "lax in their protection of intellectual
property rights or that have imposed barriers to market access." Id at 267.
102 Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode
II): Protecting Intellectual
Propertyin Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 901, 925 (2005-06).
'03 Id. at 926.

Id. See also Omario Kanji, Note, Paper Dragon: Inadequate
Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights in China, 27 MICH. J. INTL L. 1261, 1263 (2006) (noting
that, in 2005, fourteen Senators requested that President Bush "take action against
China's rampant IPR infringement.").
105 Kanji, supra note 104,
at 1262.
106 Request for Consultations by the United States,
China - Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 3-6,
WT/DS362/1/IP/D/26/G/L/819 (Apr. 16, 2007) [hereinafter WTO Complaint]; see
Lacey, supra note 23, at 33; see also Kim, supra note 91, at 104 (the U.S. was not
alone in its complaint against China. "Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
European Communities, India, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, and
Turkey joined" the U.S. in its initial request for consultation with China on April 10,
2007).
107See generally WTO Complaint,supra note 106; Kim, supra
note 91, at 104-08.
'08 WTO Complaint, supra note 106, at 3-6; Lacey, supra note 23, at 33; Yang, supra
note 9, 6-7.
'09 WTO Complaint, supra note 106, at 3-6.
104
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failed content review or had portions deleted in order to meet the
requirements under Article 4(1) of China's Copyright Act. 110
Furthermore, as Article 4(1) of China's Copyright Act denied
copyright protection to works that otherwise should be granted
protection under Article 9.1 of TRIPS, the DSB also found Article 4 of
China's Copyright Act incompatible with Article 41.1 of TRIPs, which
requires the availability of proper enforcement actions to works
afforded copyright protection under TRIPS.111
Second, the U.S argued that China's Customs laws, which
allowed customs authorities the ability to donate or sell counterfeited
merchandise instead of destroying them, thereby allowing the goods
to re-enter the market after the infringing markings have been striped
away, violated Article 46 and 59 of TRIPS.112 Article 46 and 59 of
TRIPS require infringing goods to be disposed, without any
compensation, "outside the channels of commerce in such a manner
as to avoid any harm caused to the right holder, or, unless this would
be contrary to existing constitutional requirements, destroyed."1 13
Here, the DSB agreed in part with the U.S., finding that in situations
where counterfeit trademark goods were sent back into channels of
commerce, TRIPS requires more than simply removing the
trademark, and thus China was in violation of Article 46 of TRIPS in

110WORLD
SUMMARIES

WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: ONE-PAGE CASE
1995-2009 139 (2010) [hereinafter WTO Summaries]; Yang, supra note

TRADE ORGANIZATION,

9, at 7-8 (article 9.1 of TRIPS states that "[m]embers shall comply with Articles I
through 21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto."); Lacey,
supra note 23, at 33-34 (works that were deemed to be "prohibited by law" were not
afforded copyright protection under the Chinese Copyright Act, which reflects the
general belief that China likes to strictly censor certain works that it may not find
beneficial to its government, i.e., politically sensitive works, and the failure to afford
copyright protection to certain works has limited the ability of U.S. copyright
holders to assert their rights in China against potential infringers).
I WTO Summaries, supra note 110; see Yang, supra note 9, at 6-7.
112 WTO Complaint, supra note 106, at 3; see
also Lacey, supra note 23, at 34; Yang,
supra note 9, at 9 (China has three methods for dealing with the confiscated goods,
which include "(1) donating the goods to public welfare bodies or assigning the
goods to the IP rights holder with compensation; (2) auctioning the goods after
completely eradicating the infringing features and packaging of the goods; and (3)
destroying the goods if the infringing features cannot be eradicated.").
113TRIPS, supra note 92, at art.
59.
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that respect.114 However, the DSB did not completely agree with the
U.S.'s assertions, finding that Article 59 of TRIPS only required
authorities to have the right to either destroy or dispose of goods, and
that disposal "in such a manner as to avoid any harm caused to the
right holder[s]" only applied with infringing products disposed
outside the channels of commerce. 115 The DSB went on to say that as
China sold goods for charitable distribution, the goods were "not in
fact charitably disposed of outside the channels of commerce but into
the channels of commerce." 116 Furthermore, the fact that goods
donated to the charitable organizations are distributed and are later
circulated back into channels of commerce, "does not alter the fact
that the goods were disposed outside the channels of commerce, in
the ordinary sense of 'disposal."'' 7
Finally, the U.S. challenged China's high thresholds for
prosecution of copyright infringers, claiming this violated Articles 41
and 61 of TRIPS.118 Using Article 1.1 and 41.5 of TRIPS to determine
its obligations under Article 61,119 China argued that the measures in
place were "reasonable and appropriate" under its interpretation of

114 WTO

Report, supra note 27,

115WTO Report, supra note 27,

WTO Report, supra note 27,
11
Id.

7.393-7.394.
7.249.

7.279.

11 WTO Complaint, supra note 106, at 1-2; see also Yang, supra note 9, at 12-13
(Article 61 of TRIPS requires members to "'provide for criminal procedures and
penalties . . . at least in cases of wilful [sic] trademark counterfeiting or copyright
piracy on a commercial scale;" Article 41 requires member countries to provide the
means by which effective preventative results are derived from the enforcement.).
''9 TRIPS, supra note 92, at art. 1.1 ("Members shall be free to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their
own legal system and practice."); id. at 41.5 ("does not create any obligation to put
in place a judicial system for the enforcement of [IPRs] distinct from that for the
enforcement of law in general, nor does it affect he capacity of Members to enforce
their law in general.").
TRIPS Agreement, art 1.1 ("Members shall be free to determine the appropriate
method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal
system and practice."); TRIPS Agreement, art 41.5 ("does not create any obligation
to put in place a judicial system for the enforcement of [IPRs] distinct from that for
the enforcement of law in general, nor does it affect he capacity of Members to
enforce their law in general.").
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the "commercial scale" language in Article 61.120 While the panel did
find that some acts of infringement may fall below all thresholds in
place by China and are thus never enforceable by criminal
proceedings, this did not necessarily result in a violation of Article
61.121 First, the panel determined the proper construction to give the
"commercial scale" language, stating that it "refers to counterfeiting
or piracy carried on at the magnitude or extent of typical or usual
commercial activity with respect to a given product in a given
market," and therefore, the effectiveness of any measures would have
to be examined given the "magnitude or extent [of counterfeiting or
piracy] typical or usual with respect to such a product in [China]." 122
In conclusion, the panels found the measures in place under China's
Copyright Act "on their face, they did not exclude certain commercial
activity from criminal procedures and penalties."123 The panel, as well
as many other supporters, criticized the U.S. for failing to proffer
sufficient evidence against China.124
China was given until March 2010 to comply with the DSB's
recommendations. 125 While this appeared to be a major victory for
the U.S., the effects of the ruling were marginal at best. As history
shows, China has already made significant changes to their IPR laws
to comply with TRIPS, 126 yet many U.S. entities still perceive a
serious lack of protection and enforcement of IPRs. In addition, as the
U.S. failed to succeed on its third claim, copyright holders will likely
gain no additional assistance in enforcing their IPRs.

120

WTO Report, supra note 27,

7.425, 7.48 1; Yang, supra note 9, at 6 (relying on

Articles 1.1 and 41.5 of TRIPS, China interpreted "Commercial Scale" to mean "a

significant magnitude of infringement activity").
121 WTO
122

Report, supra note 27,

WTO Report, supra

123 WTO

note 27,

7.669.
1

7.577.

Report, supra note 27, 7.609.
124 WTO Report, supra note 27,
7.616-.617, 7.681-.682.
125 Communication from China and the United States, China - Measures Affecting
the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights - Communication

from China and the United States Concerning Article 21.3(b) of the DSU,
WT/DS362/13

(Mar.

7,

2009),

tratop e/dispu e/cases e/ds362 e.htm.
126See

Yang, supra note 9, at 15.

available at

http://www.wto.org/english/
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IV. CHINA'S RESOLUTION TO TRIPS COMPLIANCE
As
previously
mentioned,
China
adopted various
amendments to its Copyright Law and its Customs Protections of
Intellectual Property Rights to bring itself into compliance with the
DSB's ruling.127 The National People's Congress Standing Committee
added a new clause to Article 27 and revised Article 4 to China's
Copyright Law. 128 Article 4 was amended to read: "Copyright owners
must not act in breach of the Constitutional Law and other laws or in
conflict with the public interests in exercising their copyrights. This
Country shall lawfully supervise publications and circulations of
work." 129 This change was made in response to the first argument in
the U.S.'s formal complaint that protection was not offered to all
works that should be granted protection under TRIPS. As amended,
copyright protection will now be formally afforded to all works
regardless of whether or not they are cleared for publication or
distribution in China. 130 Thus, holders of IPRs can now pursue
infringers, even if the work is not approved for publication or
distribution in China. 131 In addition, the new Article 26 reads: "To
pledge a copyright, the pledger and pledgee concerned shall
complete the pledge registration with the copyright authority under
127Pruzin, supra note

25 (while the announcement came on March 19th, the actual
amendments took place earlier, with China's Copyright law being amended on
February 26 and their Customs regulations on March 17).
128 Christopher Corr, Regulation of Business, Trade and Competition in China,
WHITE & CASE 1, 2 (May 2010), http://www.whitecase.com/files/Uploads/
Documents/China Regulation Business Trade and Competition Bulletin May 20

10.pdf (as with the initial concerns with China's IP laws, many observers still believe
that regardless of the amendments made or created, adequate protection will not
happen until the authorities responsible can effectively implement and enforce the
amendments.).
129 Jingyuan Sun, China's National People's Congress Amends the Copyright Law,

(Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.martindale.com/internationallaw/article Sheppard-Mullin-Richter-Hampton-LLP 964964.htm
(noting
that
MARTINDALE.COM

originally, Article 4 stated: "Works for which publication or distribution is
prohibited by law shall not be protected by this law. Copyright owners, in exercising
their copyright, shall not violate the Constitution or laws or prejudice public
interests.").
130 Corr, supra note 128,
at 2.
3'

Id.
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the State Council." 132 Although this new article does not address any
argument made by the U.S. in its official complaint, it is evidence of
China's willingness to improve its copyright laws.
In addition, China made various amendments to its Customs
laws. 133 Among them, the amended Article 27 addressed the U.S.'s
concerns relating to the treatment of confiscated items, and was
amended to read as follows:
Where confiscated goods that have infringed upon
Intellectual Property Rights can be used for public
welfare customs shall transfer the goods to relevant
public welfare organizations to be used for public
welfare. Where the owner of the Intellectual Property
Rights wishes to acquire the goods customs may
transfer the goods to the owner of the Intellectual
Property Rights for compensation. Where confiscated
goods that has infringed upon Intellectual Property
Rights cannot be used for public welfare and the
owner of the Intellectual Property Rights does not
wish to acquire the goods customs may auction off
the goods according to law after removing the
infringing characteristics, but imported counterfeit
trademark goods should not be permitted to enter
commercial channels only after the removal of the
trademark label on them unless special situation
occurs. Where infringing characteristics cannot be
removed customs shall destroy the goods. 134
This amendment brings China's disposal rules for confiscated
items into compliance with its obligations under TRIPS.135 While
132 Sun, supra note 129 (this amendment was in response to 1996 measures from the
National Copyright Administration in relation to copyright transfer; the amendment
clears up confusion between its law and administrative measures to secure transfers).
133 The State Council Decided to Amend IPR Customs Protection Regulations,
INTELL. PROP. PROT. IN CHINA (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.chinaipr.
gov.cn/lawsarticle/laws/lawsar/others/201003/632083 1.html (explaining that five
articles were amended: Article 11; Article 23; Article 24; Article 27; and Article 28).
134 id.
' Corr, supra note 128, at 2.
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some believe this amendment will make it harder for customs
officials to simply auction off goods, recent statistics show that seized
goods are usually destroyed and are rarely released back into
commerce.136 Therefore, it is unclear how the amendment will
accomplish the U.S.'s goal of better protection and enforcement of
IPRs in China.
In addition, the Campaign, which ran until June 2011,
revolved around the protection of trademark, copyright, patent, and
new plant variety, including: Internet piracy of both music and
movies; sale of pirated material; pirated software; trademark
infringement in the area of mobile phones, auto parts, bulk
commodity exports, and pharmaceuticals.1 37 Led by Chinese Vice
Premier Wang Qishan,138 there was a heavy emphasis placed on
holding local governments responsible for infringement within their
municipality. 139 The Campaign occurred in three phases:
mobilization (October 2010); implementation (November 2010 February 2011); and acceptance and inspection (March - June
2011).140 Furthermore, the Chinese government set forth six strategies
for the Campaign: (1) strengthen the governance at the source of
production; (2) reinforce market supervision; (3) strengthen IPR
protection of international trade and over the Internet; (4) reinforce
judicial enforcement; (5) promote the use of genuine software in
governmental offices; and (6) educate its citizens about the
importance of IPR protection. 141

136

id.
Ronald Kirk, 2011 Special 301 Report - Section I.

13

CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE

Country Reports,

U.S., http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/uscn t ipr

2011050204.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2012).
138

id

"9 Id. See also Brad Williams & Danielle Mihalkanin, China's Special Campaign to
Combat IPR Infringement, CHINABUSINESSREVIEW.COM 42, 45 (Oct.-Dec. 2011),
available
at
http://www.bakerbotts.com/fileupload/documents/ChinaBusinessReview OctoberDecember2011 .pdf (originally the Campaign was slated to last 6 months until March

2011, but the State Council extended the campaign until June 2011, effectively
extending the "acceptance and inspection" period).
140 Williams & Mihalkanin, supra note
139, at 43-44.
141 Program for Special Campaign on Combating IPR Infringement
and
Manufacture and Sales of Counterfeiting and Shoddy Commodities, INTELL. PROP.
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The Creation of a Separate Groupfor Enforcement

To ensure proper implementation of the Campaign
throughout the participating localities, the State Council created the
Leading Group of the National Campaign (hereinafter Leading
Group) to head the fight against IPR infringement.142 The office of the
Leading Group is located in China's Ministry of Commerce, with
localities setting up their own leading groups structured similarly to
the Leading Group. 143 In addition, the Leading Group worked with
authorities in each locality to create communication channels to
enhance the flow of information between the national and local level,
with the hope of making implementation more effective and
efficient. 144 Furthermore, both the Leading Group and local leading
groups collected statistical data to judge the effectiveness of the
Campaign.145 Finally, special hotlines at legal aid centers were
available to answer questions relating to the Campaign, IPR
infringement, complaints, and potential crimes. 146
B.

Campaign Timeline

During the first phase - mobilization - provincial, municipal
and central administrations in different regions created and
submitted their plans for implementation to the Leading Group.
During the second phase - implementation - plans created during
the first phase were implemented in each locality by their respective
authorities. At the time, the Leading Group supervised the
implementation progress in different regions to assure compliance,
while provincial administrators conducted spot checks in their
respective localities to assure proper implementation. 147 Finally,

IN CHINA (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/newsarticle/news/
government/201011/976869_1.html.
PROT.
142

id.

143id
144 Kirk,

145id
146

id.
147id

supra note 137.

during
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the

last

phase

-

acceptance

-

departments

in

each

participating region summarized their effectiveness of the program to
the Leading Group, addressing any issues or lessons learned during
the Campaign.148 After all the results are calculated, the Leading
Group will grant honorable titles and reward regional departments
for an outstanding performance in implementing the Campaign.149
The Leading Group will ultimately report the Campaign's results to
China's State Council.o50 However, before we take a closer look at the
true impact of the Campaign, we will first briefly discuss certain
portions of China's legal structure and history to analyze whether
these changes are short-lived or long-term resolutions.
V. AN OVERVIEW OF CHINA'S JUDICIAL AND
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In China, the highest legislative powers rest in the hands of
The National People's Congress and its executive body, the Standing
Committee.15 Under the National People's Congress, there are three
primary administrative bodies: (1) the State Council, which acts in an
executive capacity; (2) the Supreme People's Procuratorate, which is
the prosecutor and supervisor of the law; and (3) the Supreme
People's Court, which is tasked with "'interpret[ing] questions
concerning specific application of laws and decrees in judicial
proceedings."' 152 Furthermore, China's court structure is broken
down into three categories: (1) basic, intermediate, and higher levels
of the local people's courts; (2) special people's courts including
military, railway transport courts, water transport courts, and others;
and (3) the Supreme People's Court. 153
The basic local people's court is responsible for ordinary
criminal and civil cases of first instances, while the intermediate local
people's court handles appeals and protests, as well as cases
id

148

149 id.
1so

ld.

151

RONALD

C.

BROWN, UNDERSTANDING

LAW WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS
152 Id. (quoting Organic Law,
art. 33).
153

Id.

CHINESE COURTS AND LEGAL PROCESS:

51 (1997).
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transferred from the basic court and cases of "first instance." 5 4 In
addition, the intermediate local people's court handles "cases of
confirming patent rights of invention and cases handled by the
Customs." 5 5 Finally, the higher local people's court is responsible for
hearing all those cases transferred or assigned from either the basic or
intermediate courts, as well as appeals and protests against any
judgments or orders of those courts.156
The Supreme People's Court has jurisdiction over any cases
"assigned by laws or which it deems it should try," as well as appeals
involving decisions made by any of the special courts of the high
local people's court.1s7 In addition, the Supreme People's Court
answers questions of interpretation regarding the application of laws
and decrees in specific cases.15 8

A. China's Undeveloped Legal System Leaves Much to be Desired
As most of China's legal profession was abolished at the

beginning of the communist era, its current legal system is only thirty
years old.159 When the Chinese Communist Party gained control in
1949, the efforts of the previous political powers to develop IP laws
quickly became a thing of the past.160 While the 1950 Publishing
Resolution provided authors a method of recovering money from
infringing publishers with whom they were under contract with, the
154 Id.

app. Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China at art.15 (the
following criminal cases are those of "first instance" for the people's intermediate
court: "(1) counterrevolutionary cases; (2) ordinary criminal cases punishable by life
imprisonment or the death penalty; and (3) criminal cases in which the offenders are
foreigners or in which Chinese citizens have infringed upon the lawful rights of
foreigners.").
155Id app Admin. Proc. Law
at art. 14.
56 Id. at
53.
157
app Organic Law at art. 32.
58 Id. app Organic Law at art. 33.
Kate Colpitts Hunter, Here There Be Pirates: Hou China is Meetings its IP
Enforcement Obligations Under TRIPS, 8 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 523, 530 (2006-

2007).

Id (As the Communist party emphasized national control over
personal rights,
they quickly eliminated previous efforts to establish IP laws, eliminating trademark,
copyright and patent laws made by the Nationalist Party during its control over
China from 1911-1949.).
160

224

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.

V. 19

resolution failed to address infringement from third parties and
generally provided little help to authors attempting to enforce their
IPRs. 161 In addition, the Anti-Rightist Movement and the Great Leap
forward of 1958 ended high royalty payments and the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966 effectively ended any form of
royalty payments in China.162 Furthermore, many academics, writers
and other creators of intellectual property were also imprisoned,
tortured or even killed during the Cultural Revolution.163 The first
sign of change came in the late 1970s, where authors of various works
were once again afforded limited IP rights.164 Yet, the Communist
Party's emphasis on national control over private ownership 65
fostered hostility towards the idea of individual rights, as such an
interest was deemed "'incompatible with the Chinese practice of
putting societal interests before those of individuals."' 66 However,
when Deng Xiaoping became leader it was clear to him that China's
power rests in its economic strength.167 As a result, a new emphasis
was placed on improving China IPRs and joining the WTO, as China
acceded several IP treaties and even enacted its own IPR
legislation.168
In 1990, the new Copyright Law of China was enacted,
followed by the amendment of Patent laws in 1992 and Trademark
Laws in 1993.169 In addition, China also averted a 1992 trade crisis
with the U.S. by signing the Memorandum of Understanding. 170
Furthermore, China also increased its participation in IPR
161 Marc H. Greenberg, The Sly Rabbit and the Three C's: China, Copyright and
Calligraphy,7 LoY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REv. 163, 176 (2010).
162 Id. (Mao Zedong launched these programs in order to quicken the implementation
of state socialism in China).
163 Id.

164

id

165 Hunter,

supra note 159, at 532.
Greenberg, supra note 161, at 177 (quoting The Manifesto of the Communist
Party); see also Hunter, supra note 159, at 531 (stating that "Confucius encouraged
people to learn by copying and imitation, which is the antithesis of IP protection.").
167 Hunter, supra note 159,
at 532.
166

168

Id.

Wei Shi, Globalization and Indigenization: Legal Transplant of a Universal
TRIPS Regime in a MulticulturalWorld, 47 AM. Bus. L.J. 455, 500 (2010).
10 Ryan P. Johnson, Steal this Note: Proactive
Intellectual Property Protection in
the People'sRepublic of China, 38 CoNN. L. REv. 1005, 1013 (2006).
169
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conventions and its cooperation with foreign nations and
international organizations regarding IPR. 171 Even with China's
attempt to increase its protection for IP, many problems still loomed
on the horizon in regards to its IPRs.172
After USTR declared China a Priority Foreign Country in
1994, China and the U.S. reached another agreement in 1995, entitled
the Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter
Agreement), mutually agreeing to provide training, information, and
consultation on the best methods to implement an IPR system.173
Unfortunately, for an Agreement once called "'the single most
comprehensive and detailed [intellectual property] enforcement
agreement the United States had ever concluded,"' its effects were
short lived, 174 as China and the U.S. reached yet another agreement in
1996.175 At that time, China had already closed over twenty-nine
factories producing pirated compact discs and their corresponding
distribution channels, as well as 5000 theaters that charged
individuals to watch pirated movies.176

' Shi, supra note 169, at 500-01 (During the early 1990s, "China acceded to the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works in 1992, the
Convention for the Protection of Procedures of Phonograms Against Unauthorized
Duplication of Their Phonograms in 1993, the Patent Cooperation Treaty in 1994,
and the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and
Services for the Purposes of this Registration of Marks in 1995, the Budapest Treaty
on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes
of Patent Procedure in 1995 . . . . [In addition,] "China joined the Locarno
Agreement on Establishing an International Classification for Industrial Designs in
1996

and

the

Strasbourg

Agreement

Concerning

the

International

Patent

Classification in 1997." Id n.251. Furthermore, China also "enacted the Decision on
IPR Protection in 1994, the Regulation on Customs Protection of Intellectual
Property in July 1995, the Regulation on the Protection of New Plant Varieties in
1997, and the Regulation on the Protection of the Layout and Design of Integrated
Circuits in 2001."). Id
172 Johnson, supra note 170, at 10 13-14 (The USTR deemed China to be a Priority
Foreign Country in 1991 and again in 1994).
173 Id. at 1014.
174id
175 Id.
176id
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China's Enforcement Mechanisms and Decentralized
Government Present a Roadblock to the Level of IPRs Longed
for by Developed Nations

As previously mentioned, China's current judicial system is
relatively new.177 A dearth of experienced lawyers and judges,
coupled with very little case law interpreting IP law, creates a lack of
qualified individuals to interpret and enforce IPRs.178 Furthermore,
most lower court decisions go unpublished, creating an uncertainty
about the enforceability of IPR and making it harder for IPR holders
to challenge infringers. 179 In addition, China also faces uphill battles
against widespread corruption through favoritism and protectionism
among local municipalities.18 0
Many governments in China depend on local businesses that
focus on the production and sale of counterfeit goods as a source of
economic income.181 By setting economic growth targets and
rewarding localities that meet those targets with government
subsidies, one can argue that China's national government
contributes to corruption at the local level. 182 Various local
governments have created corporations, many of which are run by
local government officials, to manage and sell counterfeit goods.183 In
addition, local officials are unable to do much as they are appointed
and can just as easily be removed if they fail to follow the orders of
See supra Part IV.B.
Mark Liang, A Three-ProngedApproach: How the United States can Use WTO
Disclosure Requirements to Curb Intellectual Property Infringement in China, 11
CHI. J. INT'L L. 285, 293 (2010) (stating "IP cases require an understanding of IP
laws (which are perhaps not always intuitive), an understanding of economic market
conditions affecting IP-protected goods and, in patent cases, an understanding of the
relevant technology.").
1 Id. at 293-94.
177

178

Id at 294-95.
Id. at 294.
182 Daniel Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multi-National Companies
in

China: How a Flawed Approach is Making Counterfeiting Worse, 41 GEO. J. INT'L
L. 749, 756 (2010) (It is believed that many sellers of pirated and counterfeit
materials pay local taxes on such sales, allowing local governments to meet
economic growth targets set by national authorities, which result in government
subsidiaries if they are to meet those targets).
.3Id at 754-55.
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local government and party leaders. 184 As one Chinese Customs
official said in 2005, "we have to strike the right balance between
enforcing anti-piracy and encouraging economic development."1 8 5
Unfortunately, local governments are not given stricter guidelines or
restrictions to discourage such activity, as evidenced by China's very
broad IP legislation.186 China's IP legislation contains many
undefined terms, which necessarily allows local authorities to use
their discretion and leeway when selectively interpreting the
legislation to let infringers escape without punishment.187
Likewise, the activities of the local government and
administrations, such as the bodies responsible for handling
infringement cases, are usually left unsupervised.188 Government
officials and members of the People's Liberation Army control many
of the factories responsible for manufacturing counterfeit goods,
essentially forcing local officials of lesser power to turn a blind eye to
their illegal activities. 189 In addition, China's judicial system as well as
184 Id. at

755.
Hunter, supra note 159, at 531 & n.57 (citing Anthony Lawrence, Pirates of the
PRD, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 16, 2005, at 18 (quoting Pang Jingyue,
director of the legal department of Shenzhen Customs)).
See Hunter, supra note 159, at 533-541; see generally, Rezler, supra note 10.
18 See Rezier, supra note 10, at 254-55. For example, a copyrighted work may be
exploited without the owner's permission as long as the title and author of the
original work are attributed to the new work, and no other of the owner's rights are
"prejudiced" in the process. However, the statute does not provide a means of
determining whether the owner has been "prejudiced." Id at 213-14. See also
Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., art.
1

28 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat'l People's Cong., Feb. 26, 2010,
effective Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/textjsp?file id=186569. (In
addition, unlike U.S. copyright law which imposes a statutory amount for damages,
China provides remedies such as "ceasing the infringement, eliminating the bad
effects of the act, making an apology or paying compensation for damages; where
public rights and interests are impaired, the administrative department for copyright
may order the person to discontinue the infringement, confiscate his unlawful gains,
confiscate or destroy the copies produced through infringement, and may also

impose a fine; where the circumstances are serious, the said department may, in
addition, confiscate the material, tools and instruments mainly used to produce
copies through infringement; and where a crime is constituted, criminal liabilities

shall be investigated in accordance with the law."). Id. at art. 48.
18 See Rezler, supra note 10, at 255-56.
8

Hunter,supra note 159, at 531.
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many of its administrative bodies, such as the General
Administration of Customs, the State Intellectual Property Office
(hereinafter SIPO), the State Administration for Industry and
Commerce, and the Technical Supervision Bureau, lack qualified
personnel and uniformity between the agencies. 190
Furthermore, the structure of China's enforcement methods
(administrative
enforcement,
criminal
prosecution,
customs
enforcement, and civil litigation) has come under scrutiny.191 While
administrative enforcement may be cost effective and quick, there are
many limitations. 192 First, no monetary awards are available; only
injunctive relief, seizure of counterfeit items, and small fines.193
Monetary awards may make infringers more hesitant to commit
infringement as this can directly impact their economic standing,
whereas seizing counterfeit items and issuing small fines may not be
as strong of deterrents. 194 Even in this inadequate structure, between
2005 and 2009, nearly 800 administrative actions were brought. 195
However, fewer than half of those actions resulted in fines, with the
average fine being $2500.196 Furthermore, officials in charge of the
hearings have very limited investigatory powers, leaving individuals
with the expensive and tedious task of conducting the entire
investigation themselves. 197 In addition, those who are successful
complain that the penalties available through administrative action
are ineffective because many IPR infringers see administrative action
as simply a cost of business. 198
Under Chinese law, criminal prosecution may be initiated
against individuals for certain acts of trademark counterfeiting,
190

Liang, supra note 178, at 294 (For example, most lower court decisions are not

published, creating a lack of transparency and making it more difficult for the losing
party to appeal as they are unsure of why they lost. This lack of disclosure also
contributes to uncertainty regarding the interpretation of IP laws and what rights and
restrictions are actually afforded.).
191 USITC, supra note
1, at 1-8.

id

192

193id.
194

id,

195Id

id

at 1-9.

196

197 USITC,

198Id

supra note 1, at 1-9.
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copyright piracy, and trade secret theft.199 Much like the guidelines
for local government enforcement, rules for criminal prosecution are
unclear, leading to inconsistency with enforcement. 200 Moreover, the
high thresholds for an act to be considered criminal - counterfeit
goods must be worth more than $7497, illegal gains from such
activities must be more than $4498, or distribution of 500 or more
unauthorized copieS201 - leave many small, yet still important, acts of
infringement unpunished. 202 While infringement cases in China can
be initiated by police or through private-enforcement, most only
begin after being transferred from an administrative agency.
However, administrative agencies are reluctant to transfer cases for
criminal prosecution because they can only keep a portion of fines
issued and cannot do so through criminal prosecution. 203 Geography
also plays a role, as the willingness to enforce criminal punishments
varies based on the location.204
In regard to customs enforcement in China, the General
Administration of Customs (hereinafter GAC) focuses on preventing
counterfeit items from being exported. 205 IPR owners can either alert
the GAC of known shipments containing counterfeit items or register
their IP with the GAC for a small fee. 206 Regardless, there is a cost of
enforcement to IPR holders because a bond must be placed to detain
any shipments they report to the GAC as containing counterfeit
199 Id.

Id at 1-10.
Id (To clarify, for copyright infringement to be considered criminal, any of the
three mentioned thresholds may be met. However, in regard to trademark
infringement, either of the first two thresholds may be met to bring criminal action.).
202 See generally id (While one could argue that small acts of infringement are not
important, as there is no serious monetary harm from copying one image, it is still
the case that copyright infringement should not be permissible to certain dollar
values. As an individual right, copyright protection should not discriminate simply
because your copyright is less valuable to someone else. Everyone should have equal
opportunity to protect his or her IP, regardless of its value.).
203 Id. ("For example, less than 1 percent of trademark cases were transferred from
administrative agencies to the criminal system each year during 2005-07.").
204 Id. at 1-11 (in addition, most of the cases brought for criminal prosecution are
located in the coastal regions (citing Dimitrov, Piracy and State, 2009, 158; industry
officials, interviews by USITC staff, Hong Kong, Sept. 21, 2010).
205 Id. at 1-14.
206 id
200
201
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items. 207 However, what about those who cannot afford the cost of
the bond? Should the GAC not provide support to those who have
registered with them at no additional cost? Furthermore, should the
GAC not screen ships when they are entering or use tips to detain or
search certain ships as they enter customs areas? Even though the
GAC encourages registration and assistance from IPR holders in
stopping counterfeit items, customs enforcement is still viewed by IP
owners as an ineffective solution to combating IPR infringement as
only a small percentage of infringing goods can be seized before
entering the stream of commerce. 208
Finally, civil litigation allows both Chinese and foreign
holders of IPRs to enforce their rights through the Chinese court
system. However, there are many procedural difficulties with China's
litigation system for IPRs, including a very limited discovery process
and the requirement that foreign IPR holders have all evidence
notarized where it was originally located and verified by the Chinese
embassy. 209 Despite over 30,000 IPR infringement cases being filed in
2009, civil litigation is seen as less effective than what developed
nations hoped for in regards to IPRs. For example, damages are often
calculated based upon the IPR holder's lost profits or the value of the
unjust enrichment of the infringer; proving either becomes quite
difficult due to the limited discovery process. 210 Furthermore, courts
can issue preliminary and permanent injunctions; however, the
courts rarely ever do SO. 2 11
Id. (this becomes a problem especially for smaller companies).
id
209 Id at 1-12, 1-13 (as the USITC notes, "there is no robust
system for evidentiary
discovery; litigants cannot require the other side to produce evidence in its
possession. The lack of discovery poses substantial problems for IPR
holders...without the ability to compel a defendant to disclose information about its
production processes, method patents...are virtually impossible to enforce."
Furthermore, "the lack of discovery is exacerbated by the Chinese courts' lack of
power to hold uncooperative defendants in contempt or, where such power exists,
the refusal to exercise it... [leading to] serious concern that Chinese defendants,
particularly smaller defendants, can commit perjury and falsify records without risk
of punishment.").
210 Id (As previously mentioned, "there is no robust system for evidentiary
discovery; litigants cannot require the other side to produce evidence in its
possession."). Id at 1-12.
21 1 Id at 1-13.
207
208
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VI. A BREAKTHROUGH AT LAST?
AN EXAMINATION OF CHINA'S CAMPAIGN
In November 2010, the State Council issued the "Notice on
Further Strengthening the Management of the Software Assets of
Central Administrative Entities and Public Institutions" (hereinafter
Legalized Software Act), marking the first time in China's history the
central government has been required to budget money specifically
for the purchase of legitimate software. 212 As a result of the Legalized
Software Act, the PRC reports that all of its 135 central governmental
agencies spent $22.1 million (Y140.9 million) for 176,763 copies of
legitimate software.213 Yet, despite China's assertion regarding the
effectiveness of the Legalized Software Act, the software industry
claims to have seen no changes in legitimate software sales or
software-related enforcement in China. 214
In December 2010, China's Ministry of Culture took the first
great stride in its fight against digital music piracy by sending out
notifications to local provinces listing 237 music websites containing
illegal works and asking these provinces to shut down or clear
infringing works from the websites. 215 One-third of the websites
listed were almost immediately suspended and the Ministry of
Culture gave the remaining websites until January 10, 2011 to comply
with the notice to remove content infringing on others' copyright or
violating the laws of China. 216 In a follow-up released February 2011,
enforcement agencies were asked to investigate and shut down any
Kirk, supra note 137.
213 Williams & Mihalkanin, supra note 139, at 45.
214 Kirk, supra note 137 (The software industry maintains that Chinese's
efforts to
purchase legal software have been focused on low-end and pirated domestic
software).
212

China's Ministry of Culture to Clear Illegal Music Websites, CHINA TECH NEWS
(Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.chinatechnews.com/2010/12/31/12944-chinas-ministry215

of-culture-to-clear-illegal-music-websites (one-third of the websites listed were
almost immediately suspended, and they rest of the websites were given until
January 10, 2011 to be completed, the same month China released its list of
hundreds of music songs that had to be taken down from websites).
216 Id. (In addition, these websites will be required to acquire licenses and register
with the proper administrations in China to avoid being shut down.).
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of the original 237 websites reported that had not yet removed the
illegal content as originally requested. 217 Furthermore, in January
2011 the Ministry of Culture provided notices to various websites of
over 100 illegal songs that had to be removed as they were not
authorized or cleared by the Ministry of Culture. 218 At the same time,
the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate,
and the Ministry of Public Security issued a joint document
modifying the proof requirement in cases involving multiple copies
of infringing works. 219
Change is even becoming apparent for Baidu. On December
9, 2010, more than 100 writers and publishers jointly filed a lawsuit
against Baidu with the hopes of shutting down Baidu's illegal music
library. 220 Instead of fighting the claims in court, 221 Baidu negotiated
with book publishers to charge for books offered on their online
bookstore, and to share income from book sales and advertisements
with the publishers. 222 In addition to creating a paying system for
copyright work, Baidu has also deleted all unauthorized literary
works from their e-books collection. 223 This is a monumental step
because Baidu's free online library of books contained over nine
million documents as of October 2010, and only required the use of
virtual money earned by sharing or submitting other documents to
the Baidu e-books collection. 224
The Ministry of Culture Investigated Music Websites, CHINA INTELL. PROP. (Mar.
24, 2011), http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/news-show.asp?id=2786.
218 Jia Xu, Ministry of Culture Removes 100 Songs from Web, CHINA DAILY,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-01 11 /content 11826643.htm
(last
updated Jan. 1, 2011, 11:22) (the list included both domestic and foreign artists,
including Eminem, Bruno Mars, and Jay Zhou, and were singled out as they are not
registered with the China Ministry of Culture).
219 Kirk, supra note 137 (the name of the document is entitled "Opinion on Handling
Several Issues in IP Criminal Cases").
220 Cai Muyuan, Baidu may be Sued for Copyright Infringement, CHINA DAILY,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-12/09/content 11679276.htm
(last
updated Dec. 9, 2010, 17:57).
217

221
222

Id

Id

Authors Score Victory as Baidu Deletes Unauthorized Works, PEOPLE'S DAILY
(Apr.
1,
2011,
16:15),
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/
98649/7338013.html.
223

ONLINE
224

Id
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Baidu did more than only license its online book catalog,
leading many to believe that China is actually tightening its grasp
around digital piracy. 225 Baidu also implemented many changes to its
music search engine. Most of the music on Baidu is not only licensed,
but also operates through a Flash player, helping promote licensed
streaming, and not the illegal downloading of copyrighted
material. 226 In its biggest move yet to legitimatize its music search
engine, Baidu has signed a joint venture agreement with three major
U.S. record labels - Universal Music, Warner Music, and Sony Music
- for access to their catalogs and new releases for streaming
purposes, with revenue being generated on a per-play and perdownload basis. 227 This is a major step for China, as record
companies earned only $64 million in revenues from China in 2010,
as compared to $4.2 billion from the U.S. market. 228 The International
Federation of Phonographic Records Chief Executive, Frances
Moores, views this as "an important step forward for Baidu now to
be working with three of the major companies on a licensed model in
China." 229 In addition, Baidu has now launched Ting, a social music
platform, with the hopes that it will replace its search engine
platform. Baidu has also added incentives for individuals to pay for
legitimate copies of music, 230 and its own video site, Qiyi.com,
containing only licensed movies and television shows. 231
Baidu is not the only provider of pirated digital media
initiating reform actions; Youku, Tudou, and Ku6, China's three
biggest video websites, have already deleted infringing American
Steven Millward, Digital Piracy Clampdown in China? This Time it's Actually
Happening, CNET ASIA (Jan. 12, 2011), http://asia.cnet.com/blogs/sinobytes/
post.htm?id=63022498.
225

226

Id.

Melanie Lee, Baidu in Landmark Deal with Record Labels, REUTERS (Jul. 19,
2011,
7:14
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/19/us-baidu-musicidUSTRE761OWN20110719.
227

228

id

See id; see generally IFPI, http://www.ifpi.org/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (the
IFPI represents the recording industry worldwide with around 1400 members in 66
countries and affiliate associations in 45 countries).
230 Lee, supra note 227.
231 Millward, supra note 225 (Baidu's new video site is
comparable to the website
Hulu.com).
229
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and Chinese TV shows and movies. 232 The peer-to-peer network
PPStream has also deleted a large amount of infringing material. 233 In
January 2011, VeryCD, one of China's largest illegal content
providers, disabled all links to infringing music and movie content.234
In addition, new services are being created to provide legal movies
and television shows for the fraction of the cost of a pirated DVD. 235
Furthermore, more sentences have been by handed down
Chinese Courts. For example, in ten cases of IPR violations, eighteen
people received sentences ranging from six months to six years in
jail. 236 In addition, illegal music websites Qishi.com and 5754.com
were shut down and their operators were subjected to fines and
criminal sanctions. 237 However, not all the results have been
favorable.
Shortly after the conclusion of the Campaign, 22 full-scale
counterfeit Apple stores were found in Kunming, a remote city in
China. 238 Even more startling is that authorities in Kunming did not
know of any counterfeit stores until pictures of one store surfaced in
an Internet blog posted by an American blogger. 239 As described in
Id (popular American television shows such as Desperate Housewives have
vanished from online video sites).
232

233 id

Williams & Mihalkanin, supra note 139.
supra note 225 (noting YouKu's premier service offers free and payper-view movies for as little as $3 USD); see also Lee, supra note 227 (in addition to
Youku, Tudou and Ku6 Media are also attempting to buy and stream legitimate
content online).
234

235 Millward,

236 Chinese Courts Give Tough Sentence for 1PR Infringements, XINHUANET (July

29,
2011,
10:18:24),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/201107/29/c 131017329.htm (Eighteen people were convicted of trying to sell and/or
print illegal textbooks, movie copies or discs containing obscene content. In
addition, one individual named Zhang Xinfeng was sentenced to five years in jail
and a 100,000 yuan fine after being found guilty of selling more than 30,000 illegal
textbooks to twenty-five schools in nineteen Tibetan cities and countries; Zhang Lin
and Li Chunlei were found guilty of making 90,000 illegal copies of the movie "Let
the Bullets Fly" by Chinese director Jianng Wen.).
237 Williams & Mihalkanin, supra note 139 (one of Qishi.com's operators received a
five year imprisonment and a fine of $234,750.00 (Y1.5 million yen).
238

Chinese Authorities Find 22 Fake Apple Stores, BBC

NEWS

(Aug. 12, 2011),

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-14503724 [hereinafter Fake Apple Stores].
239 Id. (noting "[a]uthorities in Kunming began searching out the copycats after
pictures of one convincing replica were circulated on the web."); see also Jeffrey
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the blog, it was a "beautiful rip-off" of an authentic Apple store,
ranging from having the precise store d6cor to the employees
wearing the same uniforms. 240 Upon investigation, Chinese officials
notified the stores to cease the use of Apple's logos. 241 However, the
first unauthorized Apple store was actually not shut down, as
Chinese officials determined the store had a license to trade and sold
only genuine Apple products. 242 However, it is unclear why the store
was not shut down since they were in fact selling unauthorized
Apple products. 243 Considering these stores were found immediately
after the Campaign, China should have approached the situation in a
stricter manner, such as pursuing the source of the unauthorized
Apple products. In addition, the effectiveness of the Campaign is
under question because a walk down any commercial street in
Shanghai will reveal an abundance of shops still selling counterfeit
merchandise.244

VII.LONG-TERM IPR CAMPAIGN AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
WILL HELP FOSTER THE IP CULTURE DESIRED BY
DEVELOPED NATIONS IN CHINA
While there are many issues surrounding China's weak IPR, a
decentralized government 245 and a lack of qualified individualS 246
Boxer, Mission Accomplished? Not So Fast, China, CAMPUS

PROGRESS

(July 22,

2011)

http://www.campusprogress.org/articles/mission accomplished not so fast china/#
(referencing an American blogger named BirdAbroad living in Kunming discovered
three stores near her home, all within a ten minute walk of each other; she posted the
story on her blog and Apple confirmed that the stores were "unauthorized.").
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China Qfficials Close Fake Apple Stores in Kunming City, BBC NEWS (July 25,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-14273444.
243 Apple Retail Store List, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/retail/storelist (last visited
Apr. 10, 2012) (listing only five authorized Apple stores in China; three in Shanghai
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Argues, BBC NEWS (Apr. 26, 2011, 3:27 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
13185241.
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appear to be the biggest contributors. Furthermore, China's
amendments to the People's Republic of China's Copyright Law and
Customs IPR Regulation do nothing more than bring its laws up to
compliance with the WTO's ruling; the effectiveness of implementing
and enforcing such amendments will be the true test. In order to
reach the levels of protection for IPRs requested by other nations,
China must consider restructuring its legal system to protect IPRs
and implement a long term program aimed at educating citizens
about the importance of IPRs, as well as the possible consequences to
both infringers and holders of IPRs that occur when those rights are
infringed. Moreover, other developed nations that want China to
increase its enforcement of IPRs can lend assistance during the entire
process. By doing so, developed nations would have the opportunity
for both a first-hand look at the effectiveness of the improvements, as
well as to gather feedback from China's citizens. Thereafter, they can
use such feedback to tailor their assistance to help China develop a
Campaign about IPRs likely to have the greatest impact. Finally,
China can also work closely with IPR holders, such as musicians, to
teach fans the importance of IPR.

A. A Long-Term Centralized Plan of Attack
It can be argued that China's Campaign failed to provide any
set guidelines to fight IP infringement by not creating clearer
objectives, as the majority of the Campaign goals and focal points are
very broad, mostly asking different agencies and localities to
"intensify quality supervision," "reinforce market inspection," and
"fight against imported and exported counterfeiting and shoddy
commodities." 247 In addition, China's State Council created the
Leading Group to guarantee the implementation of the program and
for creating other leading groups within each locality to implement
and supervise the effectiveness of the Campaign in their respective
localities. 248 However, in a country where corruption and favoritism
are prevalent among local governments, it is unclear why China
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248

Supra Part III.B.

2012

NOT IN IT FOR THE LONG RUN

237

would allow those same local governments such great control over a
Campaign with such vague requirements.
The structure of the Campaign would only further contribute
to the possibility of favoritism if, for example, one locality decides to
"reinforce market inspections" differently than another locality, if it
would be detrimental to their local economy. Furthermore, with no
set guidelines in place, especially in regards to "intensifying criminal
and judicial crackdown," China is not chipping away at the different
levels of IPR enforcement between different localities; it has only
added confusion to an already unclear area of its law. As discussed, a
national program with tailored benchmarks for each locality depending on each locality's history with counterfeit items and
troubles with IPR protection and enforcement - in addition to
cohesive Campaign materials to deliver a uniform message, may be
helpful in curbing IPR infringement in China.
In regard to national objectives, China could have set an
"acceptable" maximum percentage of IP infringement nationwide.
Next, as it may be unfair to require all localities to drop below the
nationwide percentage, since each may have different levels of
infringement and different issues with infringement, it may be easier
to create specific target percentages for each locality based on the
locality's history of infringement, which would result in the national
level desired. In essence, the State Council would be dividing the
national requirement over all the localities by creating different levels
for each based upon their past history with infringement. In addition,
instead of having local leading groups implementing the program
and reporting the results back to the National Leading Group, the
two groups could work together to best determine how to implement
and enforce the Campaign; this would encourage coordination
between the national and local agencies in IP related matters.
Moreover, a national campaign targeted at normalizing the notion of
private IPR could make it more socially acceptable, and thus more
likely to be obeyed. 249

Greenberg, supra note 161, at 183 - 84 (discussing different approaches to
enforcement, Greenberg presents research that "most people obey the law most of
249

the time because they think it is the right thing to do").

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.

238
B.

Other Developed Nations Should Assist
Implementation of the Campaign

V. 19
China with

Other member countries of the WTO, including the U.S.,
could provide assistance to China with developing and enforcing the
Campaign. For example, the U.S. could send officials - such as
members of the Copyright or Patent and Trademark Office, judges
and other distinguished members of the IP community - to not only
assist with planning the Campaign, but more importantly, to provide
guidance, experience, and training on how to properly handle IPR
violations as they surface. U.S. Customs officials could also be sent to
China to provide assistance to businesses and Chinese Customs
officials, sharing ways in which they can more easily and effectively
spot counterfeit goods and the appropriate measures to take when
counterfeit items are found. 250 Such action would not only be low
cost, but could also serve as a motivating factor for China, since it
would be helping, rather than criticizing them for their failures. In
fact, this would not be the first time that the U.S. and China have
cooperated to enforce IPR; in 2008, the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation and China's Ministry of Public Security worked
together to investigate and convict a criminal organization for
pirating nearly identical copies of Microsoft products. 251
While one can argue that helping China establish its judiciary
will be difficult because the laws vary, assistance from developed
countries will show a willingness to help China cure a problem that
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better spot counterfeit items, the familiarity many American's have with different
products in the U.S. market can lead one to believe that they may be able to better
tell the differences between authentic and illegal items. This view is expressed by the
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2011),
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has been ongoing for the past twenty years. 252 With an understanding
on how to properly adjudicate IPR infringement cases in both an
efficient and effective manner, China's judiciary can begin to take on
more cases, leading to a developed legal system with case law to help
both possible infringers and IPR holders understand what they can
and cannot do with IP.
C. Cooperationwith IPR Holders Will Help Promote Enforcement
In addition to working with other WTO member countries,
China can also work directly with IPR holders. Currently, artists in
China have been successful in fostering a culture of fans that "accept,
observe and even help with enforcement of the copyright rights of
the bands." 253 To do so, artists have allowed their live performances
to be recorded and even aided their fans in sharing and trading them;
in exchange, fans are asked to not infringe the band's commercially
released music and not profit from any live performances
recorded. 254 China can work directly with IPR holders, such as
performing musicians and recording companies, to implement
similar programs. Also, they can establish a centralized website and
government organization to regulate and facilitate the trading of live
recordings, which can help create a more centralized government.
While artists may be hesitant to allow individuals to record their
performances, a program such as this can help break the negative
stigmas
about recording
companies
contributing to IPR
infringement. 255 The goal would be to create a society where the
norm is to respect IPRs and the rights of individuals. As a result, this
would provide greater motivation for authors to continue to create,
and in turn, would provide society the ability to further derive the
benefits acquired through others' creations.

Liang, supra note 178, at 306 (arguing that "creating a competent judiciary is a
decades-long process.. .having US representatives provide pointers will not
perceptibly speed up the process.").
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Id. (arguing that fans typically engage in downloading illegal music because of
profiting music companies).
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Other Positive Effects from Stronger Protectionof
IPRs in China

If China is able to further increase its protection and
enforcement measures, and thereby decrease the amount of IPR
infringement claims to levels that foreign companies are more
comfortable with, both their legal infrastructure and economy stand
to grow tremendously. It is well documented that high infringement
rates detract companies from engaging in business, thus hindering
innovation and possible economic growth. Because of the stronger
and clearer laws relating to IPRs, it is likely that foreign companies
will conduct more of its own business in China, helping bolster
China's economy. 256
Furthermore, China's relationships with other foreign nations
stand to improve. While some may argue that this is less of a relevant
point, given China's beliefs in sovereignty, recent actions by its
government would suggest otherwise. Speaking at the CEO summit
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Chinese President Hu
Jintao delivered a speech entitled "Strengthening Confidence in
Cooperation and Revive the World Economy," indicating China's
desire to increase economic growth and stability both within China
and beyond. 257 President Jinato is calling on both developed and
developing countries to work together in order to achieve "balanced,
inclusive, sustainable, innovative and secure growth of the world
economy." 258 In making his proposition, he set forth four areas of
interest for China, which include: "[(1)1 deepen economic structural
reform and improve business and investment environment[; (2)]
grow a green economy and promote the conservation culture[; (3)]
step up protection of IPRs and make China a country driven by
innovation[; and (4)] open wider to the outside world and take an
active part in global economic governance and regional
Patricia L. Judd, Toward a TRIPS Truce, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 613, 623-626.
President H.E. Hu Jintao, Strengthen Confidence in Cooperation and Revive
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cooperation." 259 In setting forth these points of interest, President
Jinato touched on intensifying economic and technical cooperation,
and reducing man-made barriers to technology transfer in the hope
of narrowing the technology gap. He stated, "we should speed up
scientific and technological innovation and industrial upgrading . . .
and rely on scientific and technological advancements to build up the
internal dynamism of the world economy." 260 While his comments
do not specifically denote that China is willing to be more influenced
by foreign nations, his goal of increasing the global economic growth,
as well as his statement that "it was incumbent upon developed
nations to help developing members gain access to the capital and
technology needed for the transformation of economic development
patterns, thus contributing a balanced and orderly development of
the world economy," 261 indicate otherwise. It is generally understood
that stronger IPRs can lead to increased economic growth, and as
such, a willingness on China's part to receive outside assistance and
cooperate with developed nations to increase its IPRs, falls in line
with its goals of increasing its own economic growth, and reviving
the world's economy.
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